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This  paper  presents  an  aggregate  production  function  of  the  generalized 
Fechner-Thurstone  (GFT)  form  to  analyze  the  impact  of  an  important 
component  of  intellectual  industrial  property,  namely  patent  activity,  on 
technical  change  in  the  USA  for  the  period  1947-1981.    We  define  a 
technology-changer as a variable that has an impact on the elasticity of the 
marginal rate of technical  substitution  (mrts)  between inputs  of  the  GFT 
production function over time.  Various types of US patent grant activity, 
specifically total, domestic, foreign, successful and unsuccessful patents, are 
used  as  instruments  for  the  technology-changer.    Using  the  GFT 
specification, the impacts of various technology-changers on the elasticity of 
the mrts between inputs are estimated directly.  It is found that granted (or 
successful) patents, patents granted to foreign companies and individuals, 
total  patent  applications,  and  even unsuccessful  patent  applications,  have 
significant impacts on the rates at which inputs are substituted for each other 
over time in production.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to present a model that allows an important 
component  of  intellectual  industrial  property,  namely  patent  activity,  to 
serve as a catalyst for technical change, and to examine if technical change 
has,  in  fact,  occurred  over  time  in  the  context  of  a  specific  aggregate 
production function.  There is a significant literature on patents as strategic 
instruments for innovative activity, which has been analyzed primarily from 
a theoretical perspective.  This extensive literature was recently reviewed in 
Gallini  (2002)  in  the  Journal  of  Economic  Perspectives.    Gallini  cites 
numerous papers whereby the literature focuses on how the management of 
patents  and  patent  portfolios  can  be  used  to  compete  with  other  firms, 
usually in a differentiated oligopoly structure (cf. Benoit (1985) for one of 
the first papers in that vein).  Patents may be cross-licensed between firms 
with no balancing payments, royalties may be assessed, balancing payments 
may be paid, or lump sums applied.  There are strategic considerations to 
any of these royalty compensation structures, and economists have studied a 
number  of  these  (cf.  Arora  (1996),  Arora  and  Merges  (2000),  and  Jaffe 
(2000)).    A  different  perspective  is  to  interpret  patents  as  one  type  of 
spillover  that  may  have  an  impact  on  technical  change  (cf.  Carlaw  and 
Lipsey (2002)).  Fagerberg (1987) has analysed the technology gap as an 
explanation of why growth rates may differ across countries.   
 
In short, as patents confer a temporary monopoly to the patent holder, 
they  will  have  an  impact  on  the  behavior  of  individual  firms  within  an 
industry.  It is, therefore, essential to examine how firms interact with each 
other, and to analyze what kinds of impacts patents will ultimately have on 
aggregate production behavior.   
 
The  previous  empirical  literature  in  this  area  is  relatively  sparse.  
Marinova (1999, 2001) examined patent models in the context of patents 
serving as a proxy for innovation.  A few previous studies have attempted to 
value the patent rights held by firms in Europe using data on patents, patent 
renewals,  and  stock  returns  (see,  for  example,  Schankerman  and  Pakes 
(1986), Pakes (1985, 1986), and Lanjouw et al. (1998)).   McAleer et al. 
(2003)  explored  the  time  series  properties  of  patent  activity  for  various 
countries from the perspective of modeling the volatility inherent in patent 
shares over time, and also cited several studies that had used patents as a 
proxy  for  innovation  (cf.  Pavitt  (1988),  Patel  and  Pavitt  (1995),  and 
Griliches (1986)).  To the best of our knowledge, the present paper the first 
to  introduce  patents  directly  into  the  aggregate  production  function  as  a 4 
parameter that serves the role of a “technology-changer,” to be discussed 
below.   
 
The  United  States  Patent  and  Trademark  Office  (USPTO)  collects 
data  on  patent  applications  and  patents  granted  (alternatively,  successful 
patents), with some of the series commencing in 1790.  This paper uses a 
methodology for analyzing aggregate production over time that allows direct 
estimation  of  the  impact  of  parameter  changes  on  the  elasticity  of  the 
marginal  rate  of  technical  substitution  (mrts)  between  various  factors  of 
production.    Such  a  framework  for  analyzing  the  question  was  first 
introduced by the first author in the 1950s, with Basmann and his students 
elaborating on the methodology 1987.  Using annual data for 1947-1971, 
Basmann  et al.  (1987)  estimated  the impact  of  total production  cost and 
input price changes on the elasticities of the mrts between various factors of 
production,  using  the  so-called  Generalized  Fechner-Thurstone  (GFT) 
aggregate production function.   
 
A natural extension of this research is to explore how other potential 
variables can have an impact on the elasticities of the mrts between various 
factors of production.  Specifically, in this paper we focus on an important 
component of intellectual industrial property, namely patent activity, as a 
technology-changer. 
 
  The  plan  of  the  remainder  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.    Section  2 
presents  the  GFT  aggregate  production  function  and  the  estimating 
equations.  This development establishes the framework for analyzing the 
impact  of  various  types  of  patent  activity,  specifically,  total  patent 
applications, patents granted to domestic companies and individuals, patents 
granted  to  foreign  companies  and  individuals,  successful  (or  granted) 
patents, and unsuccessful patents, as instruments for the technology-changer.  
Section  3  presents  the  data  and  discusses  the  empirical  results.    Some 
concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.  
 
 
2.  The Aggregate Production Function Revisited 
 
Following Basmann et al. (1987), we define a real-YDOXHG IXQFWLRQ \; 
describing the maximum output y which can be produced from any given set 
of inputs (X1, …,Xn).  As we believe the exposition in Basmann et al. (1987) 
is very clear, the discussion in this section follows the original paper closely.  
The production function is a single-valued mapping from input space into 5 
output space, since the maximum attainable output for any stipulated set of 
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i = 1,2,…,n-1, designate the marginal rate of technical 
substitution (MRTS) of Xi for Xn at the point X, and let  k, k = 1, 2,…,m, be 
an observable magnitude different from X and its components.  Assume that 
the production index y and all its first and second partial derivatives, yi and 
yij , are differentiable at all points áXñ of the cost domain at least once with 
respect to each of the technology-changing variables,  1,… m.  Then each of 
the  marginal  rates  of  technical  substitution  R
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for at least one i at X.  It is convenient to express the effect of a change of 
one economic magnitude on another in terms of elasticities, and we shall 
follow that practice here.  Let 
k i a d , designate the elasticity of the marginal 
rate of technical substitution R
) (n
i with respect to the technology-changing 




















   (2) 
 
In the general case, the elasticities with respect to the technology-changing 
parameters may be variable and depend upon all of the quantities of inputs, 





h k a  h = 1, 2,…,n-1, k = 1, 2,…,m, vary from point to 
point  of  the  cost domain,  even  with  the  technology-changing  parameters 
fixed.  In this paper, following Basmann et al. (1987), we consider only the 




h k a , 
are constant; and (2) the technology-changing parameters are input prices, 
wi, where i=1, 2,…,n, the patent vector, PAT (to be explained below), and 
total cost, C. 
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w=áwi, wz,…,wn ñ,  (3d) 
 
u = (u1, …, un) is a latent random vector with zero mean vector and finite 
positive definite covariance matrix,  0, and represents stochastic changes of 
technology.    Serial  covariance  matrices  s  =  1,2,…  may  represent 
persistence of the effects of stochastic technology changes. 
 
  In empirical applications of (3a)-(3d), z =  áz1,…, zr  ñis a vector of 
observable non-stochastic variables, other than current period w, PAT and C, 
on  which  the  isoquant  maps  of  producers  may  be  specified  to  depend.  
Elements  of  z  may  be  other  innovation  variables,  such  as  research  and 
development expenditures, or lagged values of C and/or w. 
 
  The  isoquant  surfaces of (3a)-(3d) satisfy  the  ‘law’  of  diminishing 
marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) at all points X of the input 
space. w, C, PAT, and z affect the marginal rates of technical substitution 
and  curvatures  of  isoquants  surfaces  at  every  X,  but  they  do  not  cause 
violations of the ‘law’ of diminishing MRTS. 
 
  It is essential to make the traditional distinction between arguments 
and  parameters.    The  input  vector  X  is  the  only  argument  of  the  GFT 
production function (3a)-(3d), while w, C, PAT, z, and u are the parameters 
of (3a)-(3d).  Input prices enter the production function only in the above 
                                                           
1 This production function is an analog to the generalized Fechner-Thurstone utility function (see Basmann 
et al. (1983)). 7 
sense of that expression.  In terms of economic behavior, the argument X is 
under the control of producers, whereas the parameters are not.  Producers 
do not choose the input prices or total cost in applications of (3a)-(3d). 
 
  For this paper, we examine a specific class of production functions 
given in (3a)-(3d).  A number of measures of patent activity, which will be 
explained  in  the  empirical  section  below,  will  be  the  main  variables  of 
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and where x  is an n-vector of lognormal latent random variables, with mean 
vector (0, 0,…,0) and finite covariance matrix,  0  , as described above. 
 
  In  view  of  the  well-known  relationship  between  marginal  rates  of 
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so that we can express the elasticity by 
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in  which  the  terms  on  the  right-hand  side  designate  the  elasticities  of 
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Note that the elasticity s ak h,  is not invariant against the substitution of the 
function f (y),  ’ f (y)>0 for y(X   However, the difference s ak h, - s ak j,  is 
invariant  against  this  substitution,  and  hence  the  elasticities  s , h k a   of 
marginal rates of technical substitution are invariant.  The elasticities s ak h,  
are the more fundamental parameters of y(X ). 
 
   Minimizing cost ( ZiXi) subject to a given output level implies the 
input price ratio is equal to the MRTS between inputs Xi and Xk.  Therefore, 
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ij  are estimated by taking the logarithms of 
the  expenditure  share  ratios,  thereby  yielding  the  following  estimating 
equation: 
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t =  it - kt    and   t=1,2,…T.  (11) 
 
We now discuss the empirical implementation of equation (10) in order to 
examine  the  hypothesis  that  an  important  component  of  intellectual 
industrial  property,  namely  patent  activity,  has  an  impact  on  technical 
change.  Specifically, total, domestic, foreign, successful and unsuccessful 




3.   Empirical Results 
 
In order to estimate the impact of various types of patent activity on the 
elasticity  of  the  mrts  between  various  inputs  in  the  aggregate  GFT 
production function, we will use the invaluable data set created by Berndt 
and Wood on factor input prices and quantities, as reported in their 1986 
working paper.  Their data set provides annual observations for four inputs, 
namely labor, capital, energy and materials, in US manufacturing of gross 
output for the years 1947-1981.  The data for the years 1947-1971 were 
originally published in Berndt and Wood (1975), and were updated to 1981 
in Berndt and Wood (1986).  Updating the data is an immense project as a 
“model” is essentially required to construct each additional observation. 
 
The hypothesis of patent activity as a technology-changer is examined 
from both static and dynamic perspectives.  We estimate all the models with 
EViews 4.0.  As is usual practice, we performed a battery of diagnostic tests 
on  our  models  before  reporting  the  final  estimates  (see,  for  example, 
McAleer  et  al.  (1985),  Greene  (1990)  and  McAleer  (1994)  for  detailed 
discussions of these diagnostic tests).  Tables A1-A3 in the Appendix report 
some of these test statistics.  As we updated the Basmann et al. (1987) study 
with an additional 10 years of data, it is natural, though arbitrary, to test for 
structural change after 1971.  There was little evidence of structural change, 
as can be seen from the Chow tests of structural change in Table A1.  The 
exceptions were for total patent applications in the capital for energy and in 
the labor for energy elasticity models, with these two models indicating that 
a  break  occurred  after  1971.    There  was  mixed  evidence  for  serial 
correlation, based on the Lagrange Multiplier test, and also mixed evidence 
of heteroskedasticity, based on the White test.  The results in Tables A2-A3 10 
indicate the presence of serial correlation and/or heteroskedasticity in several 
of the models.  Lagrange Multiplier tests for normality indicated that, in 
almost all cases, the null hypothesis of normality could not be rejected.  
 
Owing to these potential departures from the standard assumptions, 
estimation  of  (10)  for  the  static  model,  which  relies  only  on 
contemporaneous patent activity, is undertaken by weighted least squares.  
The  Newey-West  (1987)  HAC  method  is  used  to  adjust  for  potential 
heteroskedasticity  and/or  serial  correlation  in  order  to  yield  robust  and 
consistent estimates of the covariance matrix.  All the models are estimated 
using the EViews 4.0 econometric software package.  Equation (10) is also 
estimated using a series of dynamic specifications under GMM to test the 
hypothesis  that  there  may  be  lagged  effects  of  various  types  of  patent 
activity on current aggregate production.  Further discussion regarding both 
modeling strategies is given below.   
 
As  the  alternative  measures  of  patent  activity,  we  use  annual  data 
from  the  USPTO  for  total  patent  applications,  patents  granted  (namely 
successful patents) to domestic companies and individuals, patents granted 
to foreign companies and individuals, and unsuccessful patents, for the years 
1947-1981,  cf.  http://www.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm.  
We also define a variable as “unsuccessful patent applications”, namely the 
difference between patent  applications  and patents granted  for  any given 
year.    This  variable  is  clearly  an  approximation,  in  light  of  the  timing 
differential associated with the process of submitting a patent application to 
the USPTO and its subsequent approval or rejection.  If the rate of success of 
patent  applications  remains  relatively  constant  over  time,  the  timing  of 
patent applications versus patents granted would not be crucial.  According 
to  Jim  Hirabayashi  of  the  USPTO,  Patent  Statistics  Section,  data  for 
measuring unsuccessful (namely, rejected) patent applications back to 1947 
are  not  available.    Moreover,  a  consistent  series  of  data  for  measuring 
foreign applications are also not available from 1947.  
 
  In  using  the  framework  in  (10)  to  estimate  the  elasticities  of  the 
factors  with  respect  to  the  mrts,  an  important  issue  is  whether  the 
relationship  between  patent  activity  and  the  elasticities  is  statistically 
significant and, if so, whether the relationship is static or dynamic.  One 
might logically conclude that patent applications submitted in a particular 
year may take time to infiltrate the fields in which they are made.  These 
innovations may require time to have an ultimate impact on the technologies 
of those various production processes and scientific processes.  It is also 11 
possible that, as some fields such as pharmaceuticals require a substantial 
lead  time,  by  the  time  a  patent  application  is  submitted  or  granted,  the 
advance  has  already  been  assimilated  in  the  field  through  different 
manifestations.  In some industrial areas for which the imitation costs might 
be considerably lower than the costs of the original invention, this issue 
becomes all the more significant.  
 
As  noted  above,  in  order  to  examine  the  question  from  a  static 
perspective,  (10)  was  specified  in  the  empirical  model  to  include  only 
alternative  types  of  contemporaneous  patent  activity.    Specifically,  we 
analysed the elasticities of the mrts between the following pairs of inputs: 
labor and capital, materials and capital, energy and capital, energy and labor, 
materials and labor, and materials and energy.  Equations (9a-b) illustrate 
that symmetry exists between these and the other combinations that might be 
examined.   
 
In the purely contemporaneous models, the elasticities are presumed 
to depend on current input prices, total cost and current patent activity, as 
measured by total patents granted, total patent applications, foreign patents 
granted, and unsuccessful patent applications, in each year.  It is argued in 
this  paper  that  a  distinction  should  be  made  between  successful  and 
unsuccessful  patent  applications  for  purposes  of  efficiency  and  efficacy.  
Patents can be a genuinely novel invention or might be lacking in novelty. 
Moreover, patents can be rejected for a variety of reasons, but successful 
patents  (that  is, granted patents) satisfy  the  definition of  novel  industrial 
intellectual  property,  and  hence  contribute  to  technical  change  via 
innovation.   It is also  possible that  unsuccessful  patent  applications may 
contribute to novel industrial intellectual property, though their contribution 
to technical change might be regarded as less innovative. 
 
The empirical results in the static models are mixed, depending on the 
particular patent activity examined, in that the Newey-West HAC estimators 
indicate that some technology-change interpretations may be made for some 
patent activities but not for others.      
 
  Tables  1-4  report  cases  where  changes  in  contemporaneous  patent 
activity over time have a significant impact on the elasticity of the mrts 
between various factors of production, as do some current input prices and 
total  cost.    The  estimates  reported  in  these  tables  are  those  that  are 
statistically significant at the 5% level, unless noted otherwise in the table.  
We also report results for variables that are statistically significant at the 12 
10% level, although these are relatively few in number.  For coefficients that 
are significant at the 10% but not at the 5% level, we report the probabilities 
below the estimated coefficients.  Thus, the coefficients reported in Tables 1 
and 2 are all statistically significant at the 5% level.  None of the variables 
had any coefficient estimates that were significant at the 10% level but not at 
the 5% level.  In Tables 3 and 4, there were three patent activity variables 
that had coefficient estimates that were statistically significant at the 10% 
level,  and  those  are  indicated  in  the  tables  where  their  probabilities  are 
reported below the coefficient estimates.  If an estimated coefficient is not 
reported,  this  means  that  the  associated  variable  was  not  statistically 
significant at either the 5% or 10% level.   
 
In Table 1 we also report the statistically significant results for input 
prices and total cost.  Interestingly, as we change the patent activity from 
Tables 1-5, in virtually every case the significance of the input prices and 
total cost is robust.  Thus, in Tables 2-6 we only report these results again 
when the patent activity variable is also statistically significant.  To reiterate, 
if  an  input  price  is  statistically  significant  when  granted  patents  are  the 
patent activity, then that input price is also generally statistically significant 
when total patent applications are the patent activity under scrutiny.   
 
When we compare our results in Tables 1-5 to the empirical results 
reported in Basmann et al. (1987), some of the results have changed while 
some  others  were not  particularly  different.    Thus,  if  we  re-estimate  the 
models in Basmann et al. (1987) using the updated data (that is, with ten 
additional annual observations), the empirical results regarding the impact 
on the mrts are different between some of the factors of production.  When 
we also incorporate the patent activity variables, it is found that some of the 
mrts coefficient estimates change signs, while others remain at roughly the 
same order of magnitude as in the original Basmann et al. (1987) paper.  As 
the patent activity variables are typically highly correlated with the input 
prices  and  with  total  cost,  this  would  seem  to  suggest  that  some  of  the 
estimates  in  the  original  models  may  have  been  subject  to  a  degree  of 
omitted variable bias.     
 
As can be seen in Table 1, patent grants are associated in 4 of 6 cases 
with a statistically significant impact on the mrts between various factors of 
production.  It should be noted that materials make up over 60% of the cost 
shares of aggregate production in the US economy over time, followed by 
labor with over 25% of the cost shares (cf. Berndt and Wood (1975, 1986)).  
Capital and energy combined make up less than 10% of the cost of total 13 
production.  Thus, it could be argued that the mrts between materials and 
labor (ml) is the most important with respect to actual cost and efficiency 
implications.  Table  1  indicates  that  an  increase  in  patents  granted  from 
1947-1981 is associated with no statistically significant impact on the rates 
at which labor is substituted for materials, as well as labor for energy.  This 
may not be particularly surprising as materials, in conjunction with labor, 
may not have high elasticities of substitution between them.  
 
Table 1 indicates that an increase in patents granted from 1947-1981 
is  associated  with  a  decrease  of  11%  in  the  rate  at  which  capital  is 
substituted for materials.  An increase in patent activity is associated with a 
9% increase in the rate at which energy is substituted for materials, and an 
increase in patent activity is associated with a decrease of 13% in the rate at 
which labor is substituted for capital, after adjusting for other variables that 
have an impact on the elasticity of the mrts.  An increase in patents granted 
can  also  be  seen  to  decrease  the  rate  at  which  capital  is  substituted  for 
energy by 12%.     
 
  Table 2 repeats the exercise for foreign patent grants as the patent 
activity.  As can be seen, an increase in foreign patents granted from 1947-
1981 is associated with a decrease of 11% in the rate at which capital is 
substituted for labor, and with a decrease of 8% in the rate at which capital is 
substituted for materials. These estimated effects are slightly smaller than 
their counterparts in Table 1 when total granted patents are considered as the 
patent activity. 
 
The results in Tables 3-5 also indicate some statistically significant 
impacts  when  the  patent  activity  is  changed  to  unsuccessful  patent 
applications, total patent applications, and granted patents for plants.  An 
increase in any of these patent activities from 1947-1981 is associated with 
an increase in the rate at which one input is substituted for another.  
 
What  all  of  these  models  indicate  is  that  the  patent  process  is 
undertaken to create innovation, which in turn induces technical change.  For 
better or for worse, in an aggregate production model, these empirical results 
indicate that the level of patent activity is frequently associated with having 
an impact on the rate at which factors of production are substituted for each 
other  over  the  period  1947-1981,  as  given  in  the  statistically  significant 
effects on the mrts between various factors of production.  
 14 
  Finally, Table 6 reports the results for the various dynamic models, 
which  were  estimated  by  the  Generalized  Methods  of  Moments  (GMM) 
method.  The models were estimated with a dynamic specification under 
GMM since it is a robust estimator that does not require information as to 
the exact distribution of the disturbances.  GMM is performed here with 
HAC, so that the estimates under GMM-HAC provide estimates that are 
robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity of an unknown form.  In 
all the models under the dynamic specification, lagged values of the patent 
activity  are  included  in  the  regression  models.  When  contemporaneous 
values were included in these models simultaneously, none was found to be 
significant, so these variables were omitted from the analysis.   
 
Interestingly,  only  for  the  patent  activity  of  total  patent  grants, 
specifically  for  that  variable  lagged  two  years,  did  we  uncover  any 
statistically  significant  impacts  on  the  elasticities  of  the  mrts  of  various 
factors of production.  When patents granted were lagged two years, this 
decreased the mrts between materials and labor by 25%, and increased the 
mrts between labor and capital by 36%.  Other lag structures were analysed, 
both individually and jointly, but no other significant dynamic effects were 
found.  The dynamic hypothesis was also tested for various other patent 
activities, but no significant dynamic effects were detected.  
 
Overall, total patents  granted  (that  is,  successful  patents) generally 
had negative effects on the mrts between inputs, namely, in 4 of 6 cases (3 of 
4 cases in Table 1, and 1 of 2 cases in Table 6).  Three other types of patent 
activity had unambiguous directional effects on the mrts between various 
inputs.  Patents granted to foreign companies and individuals had negative 
effects on the mrts between inputs (2 of 2 cases in Table 2).  Unsuccessful 
patents had positive effects on the mrts between inputs (3 of 3 cases in Table 
3).  Patent applications (which include unsuccessful patents) had positive 
effects on the mrts between inputs (3 of 3 cases in Table 4, and 1 of 1 in 
Table 5).   
 
We  also  estimated  various  models  whereby  successful  and 
unsuccessful  patent  applications  were  included  in  the  models 
simultaneously.    Interestingly,  when  contemporaneous  values  of  both 
variables were included in the models simultaneously, neither patent activity 
variable  was  found  to  be  statistically  significant.    Another  interesting 
empirical result was obtained when current granted patents were included in 
a model with unsuccessful patent applications lagged two periods, in that 
both variables were found to be significant at the 5% level with respect to 15 
the mrts between capital and materials, with coefficients of -.11 and .037, 
respectively.  No other combination was found to be statistically significant, 
regardless of the lag structure employed.  
 
 
4.   Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper presented an aggregate production function of the generalized 
Fechner-Thurstone  (GFT)  form  that  had  the  flexibility  to  allow  an 
examination  of  the  impact  of  an  important  component  of  intellectual 
industrial  property,  namely  various  types  of  patent  activity,  on  technical 
change in the USA for the period 1947-1981.  We defined a technology-
changer as a variable that has an impact on the elasticity of the marginal rate 
of  technical  substitution  (mrts)  between  inputs  of  the  GFT  production 
function over time.   
 
  Various types of US patent grant activity, specifically total, domestic, 
foreign, successful and unsuccessful patents, were used as instruments for 
the  technology-changer.    Using  the  GFT  specification,  the  impacts  of 
various  technology-changers  on the  elasticity  of  the  mrts  between  inputs 
were estimated directly.   It is found that granted  (or  successful) patents, 
patents  granted  to  foreign  companies  and  individuals,  total  patent 
applications,  and  even  unsuccessful  patent  applications,  have  significant 
impacts on the rates at which inputs are substituted for each other over time 
in production.  
 
In future research, we intend to extend the analysis in this paper to 
examine  the  issue  of  the  impact  of  various  types  of  patent  activity  on 
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MRS LK  MRS EK  MRS MK  MRS EL  MRS ML  MRS ME 
Cost  .82  .40  1.10  -.68  .28  .69 
PK  -.94  -.86  -.89  -.16  .11   
PL    -.55  -1.17  .43  -.95  -.61 
P     .69        -.64 
PM        -.79  .69   
             
Total  
patents 
-.13  -.12  -.11      .09 
granted             
             
Adjusted R
2   .91  .97  .89  .98  .83  .99 
          
 
 




MRS LK  MRS EK  MRS MK  MRS EL  MRS ML  MRS ME 
Cost  .80    1.09       
PK  -.96    -.83       
PL      -1.10       
P              
PM             



















MRS LK  MRS EK  MRS MK  MRS EL  MRS ML  MRS ME 
Cost  .88  .47  1.16       
PK  -.97  -.89  -.85       
PL  -.46  -.80  -1.39       
P     .69         
PM             







.08  .07 
(.06) 




2  .90  .97  .89       
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MRS LK  MRS EK  MRS MK  MRS EL  MRS ML  MRS ME 
Cost    .42    -.44  .26   
PK    -.90      .103     
PL    -.91    -.51  -1.03   
P     .78    .57     
PM        1.04  .91   




  .33 
(.09) 
  .22  .11   
Adjusted R








MRS LK  MRS EK  MRS MK  MRS EL  MRS ML  MRS ME 
Cost      1.27       
PK      -.88       
PL      -1.39       
P       .21       
PM             
             
Plant patent  
applications 
 
    .08 
(.06) 
     
Adjusted R








MRS LK  MRS EK  MRS MK  MRS EL  MRS ML  MRS ME 
             
Patents 
granted (-1) 
           
             
Patents 
granted (-2) 
.36        -.25   




           
Joint 
significance 
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MRS LK  MRS EK  MRS MK  MRS EL  MRS ML  MRS ME 
Total patents 
granted 
.32         
(.93) 
.93         
(.50) 




1.26       
(.31) 




.20         
(.98) 
  1.008     
(.45) 
     
Total patent 
applications 
  2.56       
(.04) 
  3.29     
(.015) 






.49         
(.82) 
.75         
(.63) 
.96         
(.47) 
     
The number reported is the F-statistic, while the number in parentheses is the associated probability under 
the null hypothesis of no breakpoint. 
 
 




MRS LK  MRS EK  MRS MK  MRS EL  MRS ML  MRS ME 
Total patents 
granted 
3.86         
(.03) 
7.64         
(.002) 










3.52         
(.044) 
  4.67 
(.45) 
     
Total patent 
applications 
  8.49       
(.001) 
  1.98     
(.157) 






4.78         
(.017) 
7.17         
(.003) 
4.78         
(.017) 
     
The number reported is the F-statistic, while the number in parentheses is the associated probability under 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
 
 




MRS LK  MRS EK  MRS MK  MRS EL  MRS ML  MRS ME 
Total patents 
granted 
.65         
(.80) 
4.76         
(.019) 






4.42       
(.02) 
Foreign 
patents   
1.19         
(.433) 
  6.57 
(.007) 
     
Total patent 
applications 
  2.98       
(.069) 
  1.92     
(.187) 






.92         
(.594) 
4.09         
(.030) 
2.53         
(.102) 
     
The number reported is the F-statistic, while the number in parentheses is the associated probability under 
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity against an heteroskedastic alternative of an unknown form.  
 